The February Report
Gambit Forecaster’s February Report: 2026 Senate and Gubernatorial Races
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With the first full month of the election cycle now behind us, the 2026 midterm elections are beginning to move from abstraction toward structure. While most headline races remain defined by strong partisan fundamentals, February’s simulations offer the first meaningful opportunity to compare movement rather than simply map terrain. Control of the Senate remains heavily constrained by structural math, gubernatorial contests are still largely state-bound, and competitive pressure is concentrated in a small number of races rather than spread evenly across the map.
At roughly ten months out from Election Day, the model continues to rely heavily on historical baselines. Candidate fields are incomplete, general election polling is sparse, and campaign resources have yet to provide reliable signals. Compared to January, however, the February update provides a clearer diagnostic. The center of the forecast has remained stable, but the range of possible outcomes has widened in specific states, most notably in the Senate, where rare but internally consistent alternative paths are now appearing in the simulations.
In this February Report, we break down where the major contests stand, which trends are beginning to solidify, and which early assumptions already look outdated. From Senate battlegrounds in the Upper Midwest and the Sun Belt to gubernatorial races that could reshape state-level political maps, the next several months will determine whether today’s structural constraints hold or begin to erode.
Senate Forecast & Analysis
Thirty-five seats are on the ballot, including all of Class II and two special elections in Florida and Ohio. Republicans are defending 22 of those seats, Democrats 13, yet most states within the lineup have solid ideological leanings. The 2026 Senate map is structurally favorable to Republicans, and Democrats would need a near-perfect night and at least four pickups to reclaim the majority. As articulated in the January Report, hitting 50 seats would not be enough for Democrats, since the vice presidency currently rests with the GOP, leaving them in the minority unless they reach 51 outright.
As of the February simulations, the picture is stark. Republicans are favored at 98.11 percent to retain the Senate, while Democrats sit at just 1.89 percent. This is measurably different from the 99.8-0.2 split of the January Report.
At the aggregate level, the Senate remains highly resistant to partisan change. The most common simulated outcome across both January and February runs is unchanged: Republicans 53, Democrats 47. That result appears with enough frequency to serve as the modal outcome of the model, reflecting how few realistic pathways exist for Democrats to assemble a governing majority.
The February simulations show clear evidence of variance expansion concentrated almost entirely in a small set of swing and quasi-swing states. Democratic win probability remains low not because the model sees no plausible flips, but because those flips must now occur in combination and without offsetting losses elsewhere. In January, many Republican-held states resolved as near-certainties. In February, several of those same contests now generate meaningful dispersion.
The most consequential change occurs in Alaska, which shifts from a likely Republican hold into a high-variance contest with the announcement of former U.S. Rep. Mary Peltola’s Senate campaign. Alaska, who have adopted ranked-choice voting in recent years, now functions as one of the primary volatility drivers within the model and accounts for a number of of Democratic win scenarios. Georgia, by contrast, has nested in firmly, consolidating as a firmer Democratic hold and reducing downside risk rather than creating upside. This co-insides with ratings from other like Crystal Ball moving their ratings on the Senate race closer into Democrats hands. That stabilization matters, Democrats cannot afford to lose Georgia while also chasing multiple Republican pickups.
Other movement is visible, though less dramatic, in states like Texas and Ohio, where Republican advantages have narrowed enough to widen the simulation tails without fundamentally altering clear partisan leanings. And therefore, no change of rating from Gambit feels necessary. These states are not toss-ups in a conventional sense, but they now appear frequently enough in competitive simulations to matter. Their role is additive rather than decisive.
Just as important is what has not changed. States like Michigan are seemingly more than in play for Republicans, and the same can be said for Democrats in Maine. As a result, even with expanded variance, Democrats still require a clean sweep of competitive states and at least one or two genuine upsets to reach their needed threshold. Therefore, it seems more than likely the Senate will remain in Republican hands for the rest of the second Trump administration.
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Gubernatorial Forecast & Analysis
The 2026 gubernatorial map remains broadly stable, but February’s simulations provide clearer signal about where uncertainty is real and where January’s apparent competitiveness was overstated. Unlike the Senate, where small probability shifts carry large chamber implications, the gubernatorial landscape is defined by state-specific dynamics and a sharper divide between genuine swing races and structural locks.
At a topline level, the February gubernatorial simulations are strikingly similar to January’s. Most states continue to resolve as near-certainties, with one party winning virtually all simulations. This confirms that January’s polarized map was not an artifact of early modeling, but a reflection of deeply entrenched partisan environments across much of the country in state-wide races.
That said, there is a good about of fun races to keep an eye on:
Arizona remains the clearest Democratic-leaning swing race on the board. Its February numbers are effectively unchanged from January, with Democrats winning just under 63 percent of simulations. That stability is notable. Arizona is not drifting toward competitiveness in the Republican direction, nor is it consolidating into a safe Democratic hold. It remains a genuine contest that will likely sit at the center of the gubernatorial fight all cycle.
Nevada continues to register as a Republican-leaning contest, with Democrats winning just under a quarter of simulations. As with Arizona, there is no real evidence of directional movement yet. The race remains viable for Democrats, but structurally tilted against them. Georgia stands out for a different reason. In a similar condition though less competitive, the February model reinforces how steep the climb is for Democrats. With Republicans winning nearly 89 percent of simulations, Georgia remains a long-shot Democratic opportunity rather than a true battleground. February does not show meaningful erosion of the Republican advantage here.
Kansas also holds its shape. Republicans win roughly 70 percent of simulations in both January and February, keeping the race in the likely Republican category. The persistence of that margin suggests Kansas is only competitive under a favorable Democratic environment and weak Republican candidacy, so this one should be taken with a grain of salt. as a baseline toss-up.
Vermont and New Hampshire remains their unusual elastic selves. Despite both state’s consistent Democratic lean at the federal level, the gubernatorial races continues to favor Republicans by a wide margin. February’s results mirror January’s, confirming that this is a candidate-driven and institutionally specific race rather than a mere partisan one.
Several races that appeared marginally interesting in January now look more settled. Michigan, for example, continues to consolidate as a Democratic hold, with Democrats winning over 99 percent of simulations. Minnesota and Wisconsin also remain safely in the Democratic column, but more competitive than previously echoed in the January Report.
Pennsylvania also remains a firm Democratic hold in the gubernatorial model. Their governor, Josh Shapiro, seems slated to make a run for the 2028 Presidential election and will be running for re-election to his seat this year. On the Republican side, states like Florida and Ohio remain locked down. February does not introduce new uncertainty in any of these contests, reinforcing that their January classifications were not provisional.
February Review
Taken together, the February simulations reinforce a central theme of the 2026 cycle so far. Republicans continue to hold a clear structural advantage in the Senate, and most gubernatorial races remain anchored in stable partisan environments. The center of the forecast does not seem to have meaningfully shifted. What has changed is the model’s willingness to generate alternative outcomes in a small but consequential set of states.
In the Senate, February marks the first clear evidence of variance expansion. While Republican control remains overwhelmingly likely, the model is no longer resolving the chamber as a near-universal certainty. Rare but coherent Democratic paths now appear in the simulations, driven by increased volatility in a handful of races rather than broad-based movement. This does not signal a competitive Senate map, but it does indicate that the cycle is beginning to loosen at the margins, particularly in states where structural assumptions are being stress-tested by emerging uncertainty.
By contrast, the gubernatorial landscape has largely stabilized. February confirms that January’s polarized outcomes were not simply a product of early modeling noise. Most races remain decisively one-sided, and the set of truly competitive gubernatorial contests is both small and well-defined. Rather than expanding, the gubernatorial battlefield has clarified, with only a few states consistently capable of contributing to meaningful shifts in partisan control.
The key takeaway from February is resolution, not momentum. The model is becoming more precise about which states matter and which do not. Structural advantages still dominate, but they are no longer doing all the explanatory work on their own. As more real-world inputs come online in the months ahead, future changes in the forecast are likely to be concentrated where volatility has already emerged rather than appearing evenly across the map.
For now, the February Report suggests a cycle defined by constraint rather than chaos. The paths to power are narrow, the number of decisive contests is limited, and most outcomes remain highly predictable. Whether those constraints harden or begin to fracture will depend on factors the model cannot yet fully capture, including candidate quality, campaign execution, and shifts in national sentiment. What February makes clear is where to watch. The terrain has been mapped. The pressure points are now visible.
Check out the Senate forecast data here >
Check out the Governor forecast data here >
